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ABSTRACT
Although Southeast Europe has been a source and scene of wider
European conflicts in the twentieth century, crisis management by the EU,
NATO, OSCE, succeeded only temporarily in extinguishing the fire and
removing the sources of conflict. Therefore, the international community
should apply short-term crisis management and devise long-term propos-
als for the region.  The Stability Pact may indeed achieve a stabilization of
the region if regional players are included and their long-term goals are
incorporated into the integral strategy for the region. Both regional gov-
ernmental and non-governmental think tanks could significantly contribute
to the creation of progressive solutions within the comprehensive strategy
for the region and thus to the success of the Stability Pact as the main
vehicle of the strategy.
Introduction
The 20th century was a century of three world wars, with tens
of millions of causalties on the Eurasian continent. Central
European powers, which dominated Eurasia at the beginning of
the century, lost their might in two bloody conflicts. Only 50 years
ago the seemingly multi-polar balance of world power was
replaced by bipolar Cold war conflict. Brief bloody conflicts of
previous era were replaced by the continuous struggle of the
superpowers. Irrationality of nuclear escalation made the Cold
War environment last for a long 40 year period. When the eco-
nomically weaker Soviet Empire collapsed at the end of the Cold
War, political leaders made us believe that important lessons were
well learned and that the “New World Order” will not allow such
enormous waste of human lives and potential creativity to recur.
But the conflict in former Yugoslavia served as an unfortunate
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE 1(1) 2000, pp.19-35
example that human nature has not changed and that historical
lessons were not learned by all. 
The end of Communism challenged the European political
elite in ways that were not expected. Building democratic societies
and market economies in former communist countries in Eastern
Europe proved to be a difficult task. The collapse of former
Yugoslavia became the contemporary case study of both failures
and achievements of diplomatic intervention that should be well
analyzed. The wars in Yugoslavia have more clearly than ever
before showed the value of an effective conflict prevention mech-
anism in terms of saving lives. 
Different states with different political systems left their marks
in the region usually called “the Balkans”1: Ottoman and
Habsburg empires, the first and the second Yugoslavia. It is a
region where Islamic and Christian religions, and Eastern and
Western civilizations and cultures meet. The influences and inter-
ests of world powers have always played an important role in
shaping the regional political map as well. 
Susan Woodward noted that conflicts were fed by old prob-
lems stemming from relations between nations and territories,
which resulted from compromises, made after previous regional
and world wars.2 But, as Richard Perle has said, contrary to com-
mon wisdom, the disassociation of Yugoslavia was not the result
of hundred years old hatred among nations, but of Miloševiæ’s
intentional program to obstruct a delicate balance which was fun-
damental for the existence of Yugoslavia. 
The Stability Pact has recently been offered as yet another
attempt of Southeast Europe. However, it is important to examine
the Pact in a context of lessons learned from the breakup of the
former Yugoslavia. Too much time has already been wasted on
and Southeast Europe should not wait any longer to join the rest
of Europe in its democracy and prosperity.
Short historical overview
Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, General Wesley
Clark, recently3 stated that the region of Southeast Europe geo-
graphically belongs to the European periphery, but strategically to
its center. The region has been for five centuries an area of colli-
sion of tectonic plates of interests and influence of European
imperial powers. Each nation in the Balkan region was supported
by some European power at some time in its history and those his-
torical links are still important up to a certain level today. Primarily
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Russia and Ottoman Empire, but
also imperial Germany, France and the United Kingdom found it
politically necessary to protect their own interests in this region.
But history has also produced religious and cultural differences

























source of numerous conflicts. 
Southeastern Europe has already suffered five wars in this
century. In 1912-13 the Balkan League was created to fight for
territories under the rule of the decaying Ottoman Empire. During
the summer of 1913, Serbia, Greece, and Romania fought with
Bulgaria over control of Macedonia. World War I erupted after the
assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June 1914 by
pro-Serbian extremists. 
The Treaty of Versailles created a multi-ethnic Yugoslavia,
composed of Slavs and other ethnic and religious groups. Its first
official name was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.
Croatian and Slovenian political parties wanted unification with
the Kingdom of Serbia even before the outbreak of the First World
War in order to protect their cultural and national identity from
assimilation in German and Hungarian culture. However, the new,
enlarged Serbian Kingdom was not formed in 1918 on a federa-
tive basis as Croats and Slovenes had openly desired, but as a
centralized parliamentary monarchy, in which the Serbian nation
exercised effective domination over the police, military and
bureaucracy.
After World War II, J. B. Tito established an authoritarian com-
munist regime in Yugoslavia. He was at first supported by Stalin,
but since 1948 Yugoslavia defined itself as non-aligned in its
international orientation. In this communist Yugoslavia the sense
of belonging to a nation was replaced by the communist ideolo-
gy. But Tito, who was half Croat and half Slovene, created nation-
al communist parties, unlike Stalin, and instead of completely sup-
pressing national feelings, used them in his favor, but in a very
controlled and careful fashion. The balance of national power
within Yugoslavia was possible because Tito was a dictator able to
easily eliminate any outstanding national/communist leader. 
The West nurtured such a Yugoslavia. Former US Ambassador
in Yugoslavia W. Zimmermann noted: “Successive US govern-
ments believed that Yugoslavia could become a model for inde-
pendence as well as for the Eastern European political system that,
though regrettably communist, could be more open politically and
more decentralized economically than the Soviet satellites.
Yugoslavia’s position between hostile Eastern and Western camps
made its unity a major Western concern. As long as the Cold war
continued, Yugoslavia was a protected and sometimes pampered
child of American and Western diplomacy.”4 Some political ana-
lysts say that Tito’s Yugoslavia was the best-positioned communist
country for transition to a Western style market economy because
of its openness to western business and cultural influences, espe-
cially in the Slovenian and Croatian parts of the country. 
After Tito died, Yugoslavia had no inner interests to preserve




























Specifically, Kosovo, an autonomous province of Serbia, where
ethnic Albanians comprise a 90% majority, was a hot spot of eth-
nic strife between Serbs and Albanians, which has existed contin-
uously from 1912 when Kosovo became a part of the Serbian
Kingdom. Military, financial and political power in the former
Yugoslavia was tied to Belgrade, the Yugoslav Communist Party
and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). Through these institutions,
Serbs dominated all the republics and nations of the former
Yugoslavia. The military power was concentrated in the hands of
the JNA, with 70-85% of the officer corps consisting of Serbian
officers.
In mid 1980s, the basis for conflict was set.  The Croatian and
Slovenian political elite were openly opposed to the use of repres-
sion against Albanians in Kosovo, fearful that such treatment
would be later applied to them. In 1986, Serbian nationalist intel-
lectuals made public an infamous document named
“Memorandum” which had two significant effects: it mobilized
Serbian communist politicians on a nationalistic basis; it also
mobilized other nations within Yugoslavia to oppose Serbian dom-
ination in politics, military and government. The polarization
among nations was well under way in 1987 when Miloševiæ, an
anonymous assistant to the chief of the Serbian communist party,
Ivan Stamboliæ, made his first public speech to mutinous Serbs in
Kosovo Polje, one of a few towns with a Serbian majority in
Kosovo. The Serbian Orthodox Church stood by him, and the
Serbian political elite swiftly supported him. In 1989, before the
first democratic elections were about to take place throughout
Yugoslavia’s republics, Miloševiæ gave an infamous speech in
front of one million galvanized Serbs at the place where Serbs suf-
fered a historic defeat from the Turkish army in 1389. In his
speech, he openly threatened war in an open manner with any
one of the Yugoslav nations if Serbian domination became endan-
gered. Due to their inability to achieve equality of relations within
the former Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and
Croatia ultimately initiated a process of peaceful disassociation
based on constitutional provisions in effect at that time. In the
spring of 1990, shortly after election results in Croatia and
Slovenia were announced, Miloševiæ gave a speech in Rakovica,
an industrial suburb of Belgrade, in front of Serbian workers who
demanded their unpaid salaries: “If you are not skilled to work,
you are skilled to fight!” 
Crises management: UNPROFOR, IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, …
In the summer of 1991, the JNA first attacked Slovenia and
then Croatia. Maintaining a unified Yugoslavia appeared to be
the only acceptable solution for the international community5 at


























ed that the JNA would militarily defeat Slovenia and Croatia in
less than 15 days. Such a public statement from a senior US offi-
cial may have served as a green light for the JNA to trigger its mil-
itary operations in Slovenia. The armed conflict in Croatia, where
Croats refused to simply surrender, quickly escalated into full-
fledged war - many Croatian cities, such as Vukovar and
Dubrovnik, were heavily shelled and held under siege by JNA and
Serbian paramilitaries. The international community imposed an
arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia as a whole, which in an
ironic twist affected the victim and not the much better equipped
aggressor. The international community’s only assistance to vic-
tims of the aggression was in a limited form of humanitarian aid.
The war in Croatia resulted in thousands of casualties and
hundreds of thousands of refugees in Croatia by the fall of 1991.
Lawrence Eagleburger, the US Secretary of State at the time, later
claimed: “We didn’t have an agreement among ourselves on how
important it was, how dangerous it was, and by the time it got
dangerous, there were these splits within the Western communi-
ty”.6 By the beginning of 1992, Croatia and the other republics of
former Yugoslavia were recognized by the international communi-
ty as independent states on the basis of the findings of the
Badinter Commission.7 At the same time, Serb rebels and the JNA,
using military power, gained control of over 27% of Croatian ter-
ritory and proclaimed it as their state known as “Krajina”, which
had never existed as a territorial or political entity in the former
Yugoslavia. 
In the beginning of 1992, with the approval of the European
Community, the JNA re-deployed their entire military arsenal from
Slovenia and Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Local Serbs
employed the newly acquired heavy artillery from Slovenia and
Croatia around Bosnian cities such as Sarajevo and Bihaæ, and
the Serb shelling of civilian targets began again. President George
Bush, the victor of the Gulf War in 1990, warned Miloševiæ that
the US would be prepared to use force if the UN forces deployed
to Bosnia and Herzegovina were attacked. In a way, this was the
beginning of a dialogue between the US and Serb leadership
under Miloševiæ, who was always treated as the key player capa-
ble of bringing peace to the region. W. Zimmerman expressed his
opinion with the following words: “Miloševiæ in the full flush arro-
gance was illustrating three important character traits: his cynicism
about Yugoslavia’s unity and institutions, his natural duplicity, and
the pains he always took to avoid direct responsibility for aggres-
sive actions. The third trait was to become particularly relevant to
Miloševiæ’s hidden hand in the Croatian and Bosnian wars.”8
In 1992, the UN organized a peacekeeping operation under
the name of UNPROFOR and its forces were deployed to Croatia





























keeping operation. Evident lack of leadership, stemming from
political differences and the particular interests of nations, both
in the Security Council and the United Nations, and the unclear
mandate of the UNPROFOR resulted in such peculiarities as a
double chain of command. Hence, UNPROFOR commanders
and officials from different countries acted on what they
believed were the interests of their own particular countries and
not on a common objective. In general, UNPROFOR was not
able to cope with numerous crises, which were daily events in
the region, so the overall credibility of the UN significantly dete-
riorated. It is enough to recall the incident when the Bosnian
Serb army took UN soldiers hostage and chained them to the
bridges and fences of military facilities, transmitting their pic-
tures to the world in order to humiliate them. Another example
is the fall of Srebrenica, the UN designated “safe area”, moni-
tored and secured by Dutch troops. The Bosnian Serb armies
besieged the town and killed more than seven thousand
Muslims in less than three days and UN peacekeeping troops
were again humiliated. Eventually, the spring and summer of
1995 showed that one of the main problems for the interna-
tional community was not how to stop fighting in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, but how to extract helpless UN troops from the
hell. 
During 1993, the war in Bosnia reached its maximum
intensity. Well-armed Serbs gained effective control of over 70%
of Bosnian territory, meaning also that Croats and Muslims
were expelled or exterminated from Serbian controlled territory.
This situation created strained relations between Croats and
Muslims, and finally led to a war between them, because of
mutual distrust and fear of losing remaining territories. This rel-
atively short but nonetheless bloody war between Croats and
Muslims continues to be a source of mutual distrust and politi-
cal conflict even today in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In March 1994, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and
Herzegovina signed the Washington Agreements under influ-
ence from the US In December of that same year, the Croatian
Army began an offensive along the strategic areas of the
Croatia-Bosnia border. This was the turning point of the war in
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. There were many previ-
ous attempts at the peaceful reintegration of Croatia, but over-
all there was no success. Eventually, the Croatian Army under-
took Operations “Flash” and “Storm” in the summer of 1995.
In a couple of days, the previously occupied 25% of Croatian
territory was liberated. In the fall of 1995, after a coordinated
effort by the Croatian Army, Bosnian Croat Forces and the Army
of B-H resulted in the liberation of over 50% of Bosnian territo-

























ly reached and that negotiations could take place, called for an
immediate halt of all operations and prevented the military defeat
of the Bosnian Serbs. One may speculate that there was a fear of
total military victory of joint Croatian and Muslim forces over
Serbs in Bosnia because it could cause a great flow of refugees
into Serbia from Bosnia, which would eventually destabilize
Miloševiæ’s power. 
The response of the Croatian Serb leadership, who were los-
ing militarily, was to order all Serbs to leave Croatia. The same
pattern has been repeated in Kosovo: although they were given all
assurances for their safety by the international community, more
than 70% of the Serbian population has left Kosovo since the
KFOR troops entered the province, and the rest are leaving on a
daily basis. It is obvious that this large exodus of the Serbian pop-
ulation has not been a result of organized ethnic persecution, but
of a carefully designed policy by the Serbian leadership to retain
Miloševiæ in power.
However, even this incomplete victory of joint Croat and
Muslim forces in the fall of 1995 created preconditions required
for bringing Serbs to the negotiating table and resulted in the sign-
ing of the Dayton Agreements in 1995. Richard Perle of the
American Enterprise Institute concluded that the crisis in former
Yugoslavia was the result of an inaccurate interpretation of events
and lack of will from the international community to act in a time-
ly manner. His opinion is also that the Dayton Agreements was
made possible by the strength and vigor of the Croatian and
Bosnian military action.9 Bosnia and Herzegovina officially
became a state consisting of two entities. The international peace-
keeping forces under NATO leadership entered the country and a
de facto international protectorate was established. IFOR / SFOR
forces were successful in dividing warring parties, disarming mili-
tary elements, and, finally, in establishing and keeping virtual
peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The restructuring of civil soci-
ety and so-called nation building in Bosnia and Herzegovina has
not met with the same level of success.
Susan Woodward from the Brookings Institute claimed that
NATO did not have the institutional capacity to develop a con-
sciousness about the real sources of the problem. The conse-
quences of that can be illustrated by the situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which is barely able to function as a state, and all
its nations are unsatisfied by the political provisions.10
The UN High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in
charge of the social reconstruction provisioned by the Dayton
Agreements, was not able to produce the desired results. The for-
mer commander of SFOR, General Leighton W. Smith comment-
ed: “On the civil side, Carl Bildt, the first HR, was given an impos-




























of private volunteer organizations (PVO) and non-governmental
organizations (NGO), very few of which wanted any part of being
told what to do. Bildt had no staff and no plan.”11
In 1999, Slobodan Miloševiæ decided to take the next step in
his thus far unsuccessful political program of creating a Greater
Serbia: his military and police forces intensified the campaign of
repression in Kosovo. The NATO air strikes that followed did not
preclude the humanitarian disaster in the province. On the con-
trary, the ground offensive intensified and resulted in one million
refugees and tens of thousands of casualties. After 78 days, the
air campaign over Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, and Vojvodina,
stopped and international forces entered the Kosovo province. 
Consequences of the crises
Today, the region of Southeast Europe enters the 21st century
faced with at least the same number of problems in 1991. The sit-
uation in the region may be considered even more complex today
than ten years ago. It has finally been realized, however, that those
problems were inherent and structural, and that they can be
resolved only with a comprehensive approach, addressing a wide
range of issues in a systematic manner.
A tragic chain of events in the former Yugoslavia started with
war in Slovenia in 1990 and lasted for almost ten years. The con-
flict in Southeast Europe has produced important implications not
only for Europe, but also for other parts of the world. The results
on the ground were hundreds of thousands killed and over one
million refugees, mostly to Croatia, Germany, Italy, Macedonia
and a few other countries. In the humanitarian sense, the refugees
fleeing to neighboring and distant countries seeking aid were not
foreseen and anticipated by European power centers in 1990. 
Armed conflicts in Southeast Europe from 1991 to 1999 have
resulted in the displacement of whole nations, massive human
casualties and traumas. Infrastructure has been devastated,
economies ruined, investments stopped, and many well-educated
people, who were capable of contributing to the recovery of
regional economies, have left the region permanently. The emo-
tional profile of individuals and of even whole nations has been
reshaped, and thus their political attitudes have been changed.
Differences among the nations of Southeast Europe prior to the
escalation of conflicts in 1991 have deepened in the last ten
years. 
The inability of the international community to predict events
and initiate a timely reaction certainly contributed to this huge
tragedy. It appears that the chief preoccupation of the interna-
tional community - primarily the European Union - at the begin-
ning of the crisis in 1991 was focused elsewhere. At the time,
Central and Eastern Europe and relations with Russia were chief26
concerns. Events in Southeast Europe were ignored and neglect-
ed. Unfortunately, the implications of the conflict in Southeast
Europe on relations between European nations, between the
European Union and the United States, between NATO and
Russia, and the decline in significance of the United Nations, were
severely underestimated. 
Lawrence Eagleburger admitted that the international com-
munity was not ready to act at the beginning of the crisis, partly
because Southeast Europe was not perceived as a region of sig-
nificant interest. Had the international community acted on time,
the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia (but not the disassociation
of Yugoslavia itself) could have been avoided.12
The international community has not only failed to predict
these tragic events but also in rare instances when predictions
proved accurate has failed to prevent and respond to the early
phases of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Some analysts
predicted the Kosovo crisis even in 1994: “If violence were to
break out, many Kosovars would be slaughtered and as many as
400,000 would flee. Massive refugee flows would have drastic
consequences on Serbia’s neighbors. Though many Kosovars
could flee to Albania, the majority are likely to go to Macedonia,
where President Kiro Gligorov publicly cannot even discuss plans
for refugees because it would destabilize the government. Since
refugee planning is totally inadequate and Macedonian resources
are non-existent, many refugees could not be contained in
Macedonia, so their movement in an effort to find safe access to
the West would likely continue south towards Greece. Some
would arm and return to fight Serbs in Kosovo.”13 The internation-
al community was once again not ready to act in time and thus
not able to prevent the Kosovo crisis in 1999 and its catastrophic
consequences, in spite of having previous experiences in engage-
ment in the region from 1991 to 1998, from Slovenia and
Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
One early response of the international community to the
crises in Southeast Europe was to deploy a number of envoys with
the difficult task of communicating with local leaders. The inter-
national community frequently rotated its envoys, which resulted in
many confused attempts to reach solutions that were either based
on flawed assumptions and concepts or failed at some point in the
implementation. It is of critical importance that decision-making is
based on a comprehensive understanding of the region and its
diversities, rather than ad-hoc decision-making by individuals
entering the region in a manner of rotating, shuttle - diplomacy
envoys.
Two important lessons may be extracted from the history of the
region in order to apply accepted solutions. First, short-term





























long-term solutions, or short-term solutions as a part of crisis
management must be flexible enough and open for later adjust-
ments. Second, the preemptive actions must be decisive and with-
out delays. Timely reactions save resources just as timing delays
increase the costs of regional stabilization. The actions of the
international community proved to be reactive as opposed to
proactive. Evidently, the international community lacks initiative,
which thereupon affects its power to shape regional politics. The
quick and timely deployment of 600 soldiers to Macedonia in
1992 proved to be the most effective preemptive action of the
international community in the last ten years, especially compared
to the delay in sending 60,000 soldiers to Bosnia, which resulted
in little real progress. This demonstrates the deterrent value and
ultimate cost-effectiveness of timely decision making. 
“Prevention, however, is not only a question of mechanisms, it
is also a question of resources and capacity. How do we generate
the political will and resources to prevent new conflicts from
breaking out? How do we build consensus on strengthening pre-
ventive diplomacy in Nagorno-Karabakh or Central-Asia, when
Bosnia and Kosovo are laying claim to such enormous
resources?”14
A Need for Comprehensive Strategy
The international community must achieve two main goals in
Southeast Europe: sustain viable peace in the region through the
establishment of conflict-prevention mechanisms and devise a
long-range self-sustainable political solution for regional stabi-
lization. The instabilities of this region seriously affect relations
within the international community, which cannot afford to invest
in a regional stabilization that shows no real progress. In the
words of D. Daianu, a regional expert: “However, it seems to me
that crisis management in this region is of a different variety in that
it has to be projected over the long term. It has to be an exercise
linked with the nature of conflicts among the local players. It may
take many years, if not decades, for the wounds to heal. It may
require the presence of “outsiders” for a long period of time.”15 He
continues: “tackling Southeastern Europe, in my view, needs to be
viewed from two inter-related perspectives. The first is an exercise
in crisis management, which aims at arresting (reversing where
possible) bad path-dependencies. The second perspective con-
cerns reconstruction, a two-pronged strategic endeavor: physical
reconstruction (of the infrastructures destroyed by war); and devel-
opment (modernization), including institutional and political
change.”16
Southeast Europe has historically had many causal influences,
which are still visible in regional economic, cultural, religious and
demographic structures. As Istvan Gyarmati, senior counsel to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, has cor-
rectly noted, reasons for western misunderstanding of the nature
of conflicts lay partly in the fact that they were outside the experi-
ences of developed democracies. The values of the western
democracies are unfortunately not shared by two thirds of the
world population.17
To find a real solution to the crisis, the international commu-
nity first needs to better understand the origins and characteristics
of the problems and to learn lessons from the past. Although all
the conflicts in former Yugoslavia between 1991-1999 seemingly
had the same origins and were, therefore, rather predictable -
reactions of the international community were late and inade-
quate, and lacked clear vision and realistic goals. As the conflict
spread and the suffering increased, emotional factors came into
play and the situation worsened. The differences of opinion
among members of the international community and their incon-
sistent reactions damaged its overall credibility.
In the words of J. Simon: “The European Union (EU) and West
European Union (WEU) remain “blind” to many of the region’s
countries and their problems. Unfortunately, some of the actions
these organizations have taken may have had a negative effect on
the region’s stability.”18
He continues: “The roots of Balkan insecurity and instability
can be attributed to at least the following four interrelated prob-
lems: (1) psychological factors; (2) state-building challenges; (3)
economic development; and (4) security/defense issues. Efforts to
eradicate the sources of Balkan insecurity and conflict must attack
all these problems simultaneously. Because NATO is only effective
in ameliorating two of the four problems—psychological and
security/defense—a more comprehensive and coordinated strate-
gy is necessary.”19
The international community was, until recently, focused on
efforts to bring an end to armed conflicts in the region.
Nowadays, when these efforts have brought results both in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, it is time to initiate a process that
will lead to self-sustaining long-term stability in the region and to
the establishment of regional deterrents to discourage further con-
flicts.
The active participation of local players in the region is cru-
cial for the achievement of long-term and sustainable results, as
they have a more comprehensive understanding of events and are
aware of realistic constraints. Thus, they can actively contribute to
finding a long-term solution for the region. It is obvious that the
analytical support and education of the decision-makers regard-
ing preventive action and long-term strategies must be improved.
An important constraint that is often forgotten under the pressure




























deep emotional, psychological, social and economic wounds can
be forgotten and their effects neglected in just six months (which
was the intended duration of the first mandate of the peacekeep-
ing forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina – IFOR), or in a couple of
years. In the words of Knut Vollebaek: “Peace and stability cannot
be imposed from outside. The international community must get
people to work together in order to solve common problems. I
have no illusions about the complexity of this task. It will take
decades to achieve.”20 The manner in which former Yugoslavia
collapsed taught us a valuable lesson: each of the nations in the
area needs time for its own “transition” and realization of its full
identity. Only after reaching this “stable identity”, inherent to a
democracy, the sovereign nations of former Yugoslavia will be
able to reach excellent neighborly relations. However, continuous
convergence toward a long-term solution can and must be
assured. 
The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe
The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe is an initiative that
integrates political, economic and security efforts in order to sta-
bilize the region. The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe is the
result of an initiative by the German EU Presidency, and was
accepted with the consensus of all members of the European
Union on June 10, 1999 in Cologne. It is supported both by the
US and Russia. The Declaration of the heads of state and gov-
ernments of the participating and facilitating countries of the
Stability Pact and the Principals of participating and facilitating
international organizations and agencies and regional initiatives
was adopted in Sarajevo on July 30, 1999.
The Stability Pact is a response to the need for comprehensive,
long-term and regional action in southeastern Europe.21 The Pact
has been established as a forum where the participants will be
able to discuss measures to strengthen democracy, respect for
human rights, economic growth, confidence building and arms
control, and thus ensure greater security and stability in the
region.22 But this forum should also have the financial capability
to help its members in reconstruction and modernization projects
in the region. 
The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe is a serious attempt by
the international community to find a strategy for the prevention of
future conflicts and aims to establish a self-sustaining democratic
and economic system in Southeast Europe. To reach these goals,
the initiators of the Pact attempted to be realistic and based the
Pact on the principle of equality, since it hopes to make it accept-
able to interested countries. 
The Declaration of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe at
the Summit in Sarajevo23 states that “the countries of the region30
are the owners of the stabilization process and their full efforts and
commitments to this undertaking are crucial for its success.”
Possessing the capability to bring an end to armed conflicts,
NATO member countries should play a main role in the stabiliza-
tion processes. But only active involvement and communication
with the countries in the region can result in natural and accept-
able solutions for regional entities leading to a successful region-
al stabilization.
It is very important to clearly state the final goals of the Pact,
and that those goals ensure achievement of strategic political and
security interests of regional states. The activities of the interna-
tional community must be consistently focused on achieving that
end-state, which for the countries in the region is represented by
general modernization and westernization in both an economic
and military sense, and inclusion into Euro-Atlantic institutions, EU
and NATO. 
The economic dimension of the Stability Pact cannot be
overemphasized. “Ethnic conflict is often rooted in the economic
and social disparities in a region, both within and across nation-
al borders. Regional economic growth and reduced poverty there-
fore provide the best basis for stability. The conflicts in and around
the former Yugoslavia are a good illustration of this. They show
that to each long-term solution we must focus just as much on
economic reform and development as on democratization, insti-
tution building, respect for human and minority rights and military
security.”24 Regional economic discrepancies may be one of the
sources of political conflict among regional nations. D. Daianu
noted: “...the region is, by far, the least developed of the
Continent. There are also major discrepancies inside the region
resulting in the strong propensity of the better-off countries (such
as Slovenia, Croatia) to cut off links with the rest of the
region....”25
If the international community does not want to repeat costly
failures made in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which may be viewed
as a small-scale model of the whole region, it must understand
regional differences and must cautiously approach emotionally
changed issues. All participants in the Pact should pay attention to
the history and complex relations among the nations in the region.
A constructive approach to stabilization in Southeast Europe for
most regional players can be achieved by accelerating economic
development, and by integration in international political, eco-
nomic and military organizations. In this way, values of the West
will be adopted in a most natural manner by regional players and
will lead to changes in their behavior. 
Conclusions




























acteristics of a feasible, self-sustaining long-term solution for dis-
putes in Southeast Europe. Inaccurate assumptions and simplifi-
cation of problems can lead to unstable or unfeasible solutions.
In such instances, solutions tend to be difficult to implement, very
expensive to carry out, and are continuously unstable. Realistic
constraints - financial, cultural, psychological, and political - have
to be taken into account. Otherwise, the proposed solutions,
which seem good in theory, are prone to fail in practice, as they
are rife with internal contradictions and become impossible to sus-
tain.
An integrated analytical approach to the fulfillment of the
goals of the Stability Pact is required, which includes the best
methods for crisis management. The synergetic effect in achieving
adequate regional stability will be obtained by stimulating the
active participation of cooperative regional players and regional
think tanks in adopting strategic solutions. In order to make the
Stability Pact a success, it is essential to fully include the experts
from the region into the process. The regional countries involved
should not be left out and viewed only as objects of the stabiliza-
tion process.
A systematic approach to regional conflicts also requires tak-
ing into account more than just military factors; it must include
economic, cultural, humanitarian, sociological, religious, legisla-
tive, demographic, historic and other relevant factors. In that con-
text, an important component of such an approach is a socio-psy-
chological and emotional dimension of the problem and recogni-
tion of the characteristics of actors on the local, regional and
macro level. 
Given the future changes in the regional political military
environment, there is a clear need to improve the training and
education of both military and civilian decision-makers and ana-
lysts in international organizations, especially in the region. 
Militaries clearly have to understand that it becomes more dif-
ficult and complex to use military power in political-military crises,
especially given the new sources of threats and instabilities.
Analytical simplified models used in the Cold War are now insuf-
ficient and the future will challenge them even more. Rob de Wijk
from the Clingendael Institute for International Relations assesses
that conflicts in the future will emerge mainly within a country, not
between states. They will be conducted on a high technological
level, with very motivated combatants, often in urban areas and
with the use of weapons of mass destruction. Such asymmetric
conflicts will be the best choice of the weaker side in the conflict.26
New security management oriented towards crisis prevention
rather than crisis management requires different training of both
analysts and decision-makers alike, but the education of interna-

























Powerful and reliable analytical methods require equally reli-
able data, which rarely exist in the offices of public and non-gov-
ernment institutions. It is therefore important to skillfully coordinate
data gathering, analytical activities and decision making.
Decision-makers need desperately better analytical support to
assist them in framing the questions and weighing the alternative
strategies, in order to avoid unproductive decisions. Sound analy-
sis also requires the availability of the most accurate, timely and
focused data. The data gatherers must understand issues that
decision-makers are addressing to enable collection of appropri-
ate data. An initiative to develop coordinated multilateral region-
al data collection and exchange system regarding so-called “soft”
security issues like immigration, organized crime, drugs trafficking,
and a limited number of “hard” security issues like the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction, regional arms control, etc.,
may support these efforts in Southeast Europe.
D. Daianu noted: “...this region causes most of the
headaches for European policymakers, thereby adding fodder to
the talk about new dividing lines on the Continent. It is true that a
similar logic (language) can be applied on an East-West axis,
when one refers to Ukraine and Russia as well. However, I would
say that the sense of urgency is and should be much higher for the
Balkans. What has occurred in the last ten years in this region, in
terms of losses of human life, substantiates this assertion.”27
In the future, one of the most important tasks of the interna-
tional community is to develop and maintain a comprehensive
strategy for the long-term stabilization of the region. Problems in
Southeast Europe are complex, chronic and recurring, and there-
fore a thorough analysis and appropriate understanding is
required before solutions can be proposed. The international
community, including and relying on regional actors, should
quickly and decisively undertake preventive measures when
required, if it wants to avoid similar disasters in the future, based
on lessons learned from 1991 to 1999 in Southeast Europe.
In the words of K. Vollebaek: “We need to contribute to what
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has called 'a culture of preven-
tion'”.28 No single security institution (OSCE, EU/WEU, NATO) or
country (such as the United States) is capable of resolving all the
sources of Balkan insecurity alone. Because psychological factors,
state-building challenges, economic development problems, and
security/defense issues are all interrelated aspects of Balkan inse-
curity, a comprehensive “action program” needs to be created
and implemented.29
Political stabilization must be based on economic prospects
for the region. All countries (including Serbia, when it transforms
into a democratic society) should have an equal position in the




























Southeast have every right to strive for a better future. 
NOTES
1  We will use the term “Southeast Europe” instead.
2  In their respective speeches at the conference “NATO and Southeast Europe”.
3  In his speech, “Lessons of Kosovo”, given at the American Enterprise Institute on
August 31,1999.
4  Zimmermann W., former US ambassador in Yugoslavia, in his book, “Origins of a
Catastrophe”, p 7.
5  We will use the term “international community” when appropriate instead of the long
term “the NATO, EU, the US, and individual European national governments”.
6  According to: Dan Oberdorfer, “A Bloody Failure in the Balkans: Prompt Allied
Action Might have Averted Factional Warfare,” Washington Post, February 8, 1993,
AI.
7  SFRJ’s Constitution from 1974 provided for a peaceful disassociation of the federal
state. The Socialistic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was the official name of
Yugoslavia at the time. 
8  Zimmermann W., former US ambassador in Yugoslavia, in his book “Origins of a
Catastrophe,” p 125.
9  In his speech at the conference “NATO and Southeastern Europe”, April 25-27,
1999, Washington DC.
10 In her speech at the conference “NATO and Southeastern Europe”, April 25-27,
1999, Washington DC.
11 Leighton W. Smith, “NATO’s IFOR in Action: Lessons from the Bosnian Peace
Support Operations,” Strategic Forum, INSS, National Defense University, USA, No.
154, January 1999.
12 In his speech at the conference “NATO and Southeastern Europe,” April 25-27,
1999, Washington DC.
13 Binnendijk H., Simon J., “Preventing a Sixth Twentieth-Century Balkan War,”
Strategic Forum, INSS, National Defense University,  October 1994.
14 Knut Vollebaek, Foreign Minister of Norway, Chairman-in-Chief of the OSCE, in his
speech “OSCE priorities for Southeastern Europe,” Athens, October 22, 1999.
15 Daianu D., President, Romanian Institute for Economic Policy, Bucharest, Romania,
in his paper “Reconstruction in SE Europe”.
16 Daianu D., President, Romanian Institute for Economic Policy, Bucharest, Romania,
in his paper “Reconstruction in SE Europe”.
17 In his speech at the conference “NATO and Southeast Europe.”
18 J. Simon, “The Sources of Balkan Insecurity: The Need for a Comprehensive
Strategy,” Strategic Forum, INSS, National Defense University, USA, No 150,
October 1998.
19 J. Simon, “The Sources of Balkan Insecurity: The Need for a Comprehensive
Strategy”, Strategic Forum, INSS, National Defense University, USA, No 150,
October 1998.
20 Knut Vollebaek, Foreign Minister of Norway, Chairman-in-Chief of the OSCE, in his
speech, “OSCE Priorities for Southeastern Europe,” Athens, October 22, 1999.
21 Knut Vollebaek, Foreign Minister of Norway, Chairman-in-Chief of the OSCE, in his34
speech, “OSCE Priorities for Southeastern Europe”, Athens, October 22, 1999.
22 Knut Vollebaek, Foreign Minister of Norway, Chairman-in-Chief of the OSCE, in his
speech, “OSCE Priorities for Southeastern Europe,” Athens, October 22, 1999.
23 Sarajevo Summit Declaration of the heads of state and governments of the partici-
pating and facilitating countries of the Stability Pact and the Principals of participat-
ing and facilitating international organizations and agencies and regional initia-
tives, Sarajevo, July 30, 1999, Article 5.
24 Knut Vollebaek, Foreign Minister of Norway, Chairman-in-Chief of the OSCE, in his
speech, “OSCE priorities for Southeastern Europe”, Athens, October 22, 1999.
25 Daianu D., President, Romanian Institute for Economic Policy, Bucharest, Romania,
in his paper, “Reconstruction in SE Europe.”
26 In his speech at the conference “NATO and Southeastern Europe.”
27 Daianu D., President, Romanian Institute for Economic Policy, Bucharest, Romania,
in his paper, “Reconstruction in SE Europe.”
28 Knut Vollebaek, Foreign Minister of Norway, Chairman-in-Chief of the OSCE, in his
speech, “OSCE Priorities for Southeastern Europe,” Athens, October 22, 1999.
29 J. Simon, “The Sources of Balkan Insecurity: The Need for a Comprehensive
Strategy,” Strategic Forum, INSS, National Defense University, USA, No 150,
October 1998.
35
K.
 Æ
os
iæ
, S
. D
om
lja
no
vi
æ 
C
ri
se
s 
in
 S
o
u
th
ea
st
 E
u
ro
p
e
